Why argentina invaded the falklands

In fact the United Kingdom and Argentina were the only major actors in the conflict. In looking at the war through these three different purviews one can begin to gain a clearer picture and understanding about why the Falklands War happened. Buzan, Barry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fearon, James D. Gibler, Douglas. John Vasquez. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. Gibran, Daniel. Hensel, Paul. Lai, Brian, and Dan Reiter. International Studies Quarterly 49 2 : Levy, Jack S. Manus I. Routelege Press, pp. McCourt, David M. Thorin Wright Date Written: September Before you download your free e-book, please consider donating to support open access publishing.

E-IR is an independent non-profit publisher run by an all volunteer team. Your donations allow us to invest in new open access titles and pay our bandwidth bills to ensure we keep our existing titles free to view. Sinking our most potent vessel outside the exclusion zone demonstrated the power that the British had. On May 21, British commandos made an amphibious landing on the islands; after a few weeks of heavy fighting and further casualties, the Argentinians surrendered, bringing the day clash to a close on June In total, Argentinian military personnel, British troops and 3 Falkland Islanders died over the course of the undeclared war.

Three days after Argentina invaded the Falklands, a survey of British citizens watching the events from home found that 88 percent of those polled felt the U. Seventy percent advocated sinking Argentinian ships if necessary, and 41 percent called for the immediate use of government force.

In other words, the Falklands War was highly popular in an otherwise increasingly divided country. Vote for one. Then, Argentina invaded the Falklands, forcing the Conservative Party leader to quickly formulate a decisive response—a challenge she readily rose to meet. More importantly, she also needed to determine how best to defuse the potential military disaster.

In the event that Argentina pursues a more direct policy towards the Falklands, the United Kingdom is likely to defend its territory. The introduction of sanctions and the removal of foreign investment would see further damage to the Argentine economy, resulting in further issues in its GDP and levels of poverty. It has been made clear by the UK that it would rely on the opinion and defend the rights of the people of the Falklands.

This has been upheld through referendums on nationality and sovereignty , and sentiment between the Falklands and the UK does not seem to have changed in nearly 40 years. The UK is more likely therefore to retaliate to bold advancements made by the Argentine government towards the Falklands, because it believes it is upholding the will of the people — The outcome from the Argentine government will more likely focus on a more peaceful stance than its counterpart.

A hardened stance from Argentina will likely be felt across Latin America as sanctions from the UK ripple outwards from Argentina. Fernandez has seemingly learnt from the mistakes of the Galtieri government despite facing similar economic troubles.

He has claimed that it would be impossible for Argentina to militarily retake the Falklands and suggested he would review the UK-Argentine joint agreement , during the electoral campaigns in The renegotiations of the agreement would likely focus on the demilitarisation of the Falklands and developments in joint access to the oil reserves.

It is likely that if the reopening of negotiations fail through disinterest by the UK and UN, Argentina will continue to roll out new policies seeking the inclusion of the Falklands into Argentine sovereignty.

These would likely take the form of sanctions on the region and continued international campaigning. These campaigns are likely to provide Fernandez with domestic support, and possibly regional support from post-colonial states such as Venezuela and Bolivia who are inhabited by anti-colonial governments. A renewed interest in the region is unsurprising, and it is likely from the events in Argentina that Fernandez will seek peaceful diplomatic negotiations to the Falklands issue before seeking more aggressive policies.

The British government had shown little interest in the islands, but stood by a commitment to the islanders, made first in , that gave them the final say over whether sovereignty should be transferred to Argentina. The population was tiny, barely 1, and declining. The British government saw little long term future, and was reluctant to invest in making the Falklands prosperous and secure.

Yet it could not persuade the islanders to join Argentina, even under a lease-back arrangement that would leave them under Argentine sovereignty but British administration. By it had no policy other than procrastination, hoping the islanders might one day change their minds.

In March the dispute blew up in unexpected fashion. The island of South Georgia, uninhabited other than by the British Antarctic Survey, was administratively linked to the Falklands and also claimed by Argentina, although its constitutional history was quite different.

An Argentine scrap metal merchant had a legitimate contract to clear up an old whaling station. From this a crisis developed that got out of hand. The junta became convinced that the British would use the crisis to reinforce their naval presence in the South Atlantic, thwarting any later attempts to take the Falklands.

They decided to implement their occupation plans at once. On 2 April the Falklands was taken and a couple of days later so was South Georgia, after spirited resistance from the small Royal Marines garrison. She had gained a reputation for being tough yet was about to preside over the loss of sovereign territory. The Royal Navy came to her rescue. The First Sea Lord, Sir Henry Leach, insisted it would be possible to send a task force to retrieve the islands and that it could leave within days.

The fact that this proved to be the case was testament to an extraordinary effort by the armed forces to pull together people and equipment at great speed. It also reflected poor Argentine timing, because they had picked a moment before British naval cuts agreed in had taken effect, and when one chunk of the fleet was gathered close to Gibraltar for exercises while the rest was back at port.

The fact that the Prime Minister could announce that a task force was sailing meant that political attention soon moved on from the humiliation of being caught out helped by the resignation of foreign secretary Lord Carrington and on to the campaign. The initial assumption was that sending a task force would create conditions for a diplomatic settlement. The British agreed to substantial concessions, including a measure of Argentine influence over an interim administration while talks over the long-term future of the islands went ahead.

The junta, however, could not bring itself in the end to concede that the talks might not end with a transfer of sovereignty.